The United States has introduced automatic enrollment into retirement savings schemes, and the United Kingdom is in the throes of doing so. The financial crisis has reminded us that returns on these schemes can be poor, even negative. Behavioral economics shows that people can be "nudged" into schemes regardless, but it also implies that the liberal account of market legitimation through informed choice cannot be applied. This article examines how risks are assigned in schemes and how enrollees might seek recourse if their expectations are disappointed. Comparing the United States and the United Kingdom, it argues that enrollees are more likely to seek recourse from the government in the United Kingdom. The explanation can be found in regulatory decisions that reflect the structure of each country's public pension scheme. This structure is conducive to private risk bearing in the United States, but not in the United Kingdom, suggesting that regulatory market liberalism is undermined by a residual approach to public provision.
Introduction
The financial crisis has produced a surge of interest in behavioral economics, which seeks to identify "the ghost in the machine": to describe and explain how people do not act like the rational actors of economic theory. Thaler and Sunstein have proposed that regulators should amend the "choice architecture" of the market economy to counter the welfare-reducing effects of irrational consumer behavior. 1 "Nudge" works by adjusting the default terms in market relationships, relying on the behavioral insight that consumers are very likely to accept these terms. According to its advocates, adjusting defaults does not conflict with liberal values, but rather represents an attractive form of "asymmetric paternalism" where people remain free to make their own choices (and mistakes) by positively rejecting the defaults.
One of the leading applications of "nudge" is the adoption of automatic enrollment into private pension schemes. Governments grappling with pension reform have tried to promote voluntary private saving for retirement, but have faced "passive resistance" in the form of low retirement savings rates. Automatic enrollment has the attractive feature that it raises scheme participation while avoiding compulsion. It has been adopted in the United States and is about to be emulated in the United Kingdom. In both countries it has bipartisan support: automatic enrollment was "like apple pie on Capitol Hill: everyone was for it."
2 Enthusiasm for this particular nudge hardly seems to have been dented by the financial crisis, even though private pensions have been badly affected by stock market volatility and low interest rates. It seems that everyone agrees that more retirement saving is needed, and, in the United States and the United Kingdom, a nudge is apparently the only politically viable way to achieve it.
In promoting private pension contributions, automatic enrollment joins other more traditional forms of encouragement, such as tax incentives and employer matches of worker contributions. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, these instruments have promoted private pensions while public provision has eroded. Both countries levy modest compulsory contributions to public old-age pensions to finance statutory benefits worth some 25 percent of average wages, 3 and middle-class pensioners rely heavily on private income top-ups. Even before the introduction of automatic enrollment, the state could be seen as the engineer of the default terms of these market relationships. The vehicles available to save privately for retirement are heavily marked by the hand of the state, for example in the favorable tax treatment they attract and the regulatory framework that secures them.
Of course the state stands behind market relationships generally, without being seen as the guarantor of particular outcomes or the bearer of risks. The aim of this paper is to identify the factors determining whether, and how much, the state guarantees private pensions. Does automatic enrollment make the hand of the state more visible, and what are the implications of this for our understanding of the role of the state in a liberal market economy?
Comparing the United States and the United Kingdom, this paper shows that the hand of the state is more visible in the UK case, and traces the reasons for this to the structure of the public pension system, which has produced a close imbrication of public and private provisions. This, in turn, has occurred because a liberal welfare state agenda of minimal and residual public provision has been pursued, placing heavy demands on private provision. In the United States, by contrast, regulators have not been drawn into pursuing social policy ends by regulatory means to the extent that they have in the United Kingdom. The existence of a public scheme with almost universal coverage and a fairly redistributive structure has permitted light regulation of the private sector in the United States; the more residual structure of public provision has produced more regulatory intervention in the United Kingdom.
This interpretation of the US case may seem somewhat at odds with those who argue that private provision has developed as the reverse face of the public scheme, and, furthermore, that the growth of private pensions is linked to the decline of the public program. Hacker argues that the promotion of private pensions has facilitated the erosion of the public system through a process of "layering." 4 Because the benefits available from Social Security have not kept pace with rising incomes, the middle class has had to turn to private investments to arrange financial security in old age. But these investments, notably 401(k) schemes, have never been as closely regulated to substitute for public pension income as their counterparts in the United Kingdom have been. The regulatory approach has been much more permissive, a feature which is carried through in the US variant of automatic enrollment.
The next step in the analysis is to show how the intensity of regulation affects the allocation of risk. As a starting point, parties can be said to accept risk when they enter voluntarily into market transactions. They should evaluate the gains they expect from the transaction and only enter if the expected value is adequate. If market participants are automatically enrolled, they do not undertake this evaluation, so a different account is needed of how and why the transactions that take place are rendered acceptable to the parties. The stability of automatic enrollment as a market institution depends on how participants' expectations are shaped and met. This paper shows that the social policy context shapes participants' expectations in different ways in the United States and the United Kingdom. Expectations are less clearly anchored in the United States, which means retirees can be less clearly disappointed. To the extent that expectations are disappointed, recourse is sought from employers rather than the government. In the United Kingdom, expectations have been much more clearly defined in the policy process, which means that the risk that funds will fall short of expectations is also higher, and with it the likelihood that households will seek recourse for disappointed expectations from the government.
At this point the critical reader-or anyone with a pension fund-may ask why the issue of disappointed expectations is given such a major role in the argument. Advocates of automatic enrollment might admit that a social policy goal of promoting saving for old age is being pursued, but they would surely deny that this is at the expense of individual welfare. Is it not the case that stock markets go up as well as down, so public policy should not swayed by the immediate experience of the financial crisis? One response is provided by the analysis of retirement date risk, which shows that there will always be some disappointed cohorts who retire at a bad time. 5 This paper expands on this by showing how selectively the advocates of "nudge" have drawn lessons from behavioral economics. Behavioral economics points to pervasive suboptimality in market relations. Applied to financial markets, it provides an explanation for systemic instability. Far from being a logical application of behavioral findings, automatic enrollment into private pensions neglects the riskiness of the preferred pension vehicle, the individual "defined contribution" (DC) pension scheme. The dominance of DC schemes is the product of decades of regulation oriented towards competition, choice, and transparency. The adoption of these values is a characteristically neoliberal regulatory strategy, based on the assumption that free and informed market exchange produces welfare-enhancing, and therefore legitimate, outcomes. The deeper lesson from behavioral economics is that this assumption is wrong, which is why the allocation of the risk of poor outcomes has to be up for discussion. This paper is organized as follows. The first part sets the scene of US and UK pensions policy, tracing the path each country has taken toward automatic enrollment, and showing that their apparent similarity in promoting private provision conceals some significant differences. Some of the findings of behavioral economics that are most relevant to pension saving are summarized in Part 2, which also discusses rationales for regulatory intervention, highlighting the tension between individual and systemicor micro and macro-interpretations. Part 3 seeks to compare how contributors' expectations about the performance of their retirement savings accounts are shaped by relevant institutions in the two countries. In the United Kingdom, policymakers seem well aware of the problem that expectations will not be fulfilled, and they have taken a number of steps to mitigate the risk. But they face a dilemma: the more steps the government takes, the more firmly expectations fasten on the government, and the greater the likelihood that the government will be the focus of any future search for recourse. Finally, a brief conclusion considers the implications for our understanding of liberal political economy.
Public and Private Pensions in the United States and the United Kingdom
Throughout the postwar years, governments in the United States and the United Kingdom endeavored to promote employer-provided pension provision alongside their public schemes. However, they did so in different ways, shaped by their different public programs. In the United States, Social Security, which was introduced in 1936, provided earnings-related pensions. It was shaped by the context of widespread occupational scheme failures in the Depression, and initially did not incorporate the expectation that retirees would have substantial complementary private (occupational or personal) provision. However, occupational schemes revived after World War II, and they provided 'top-off' benefits. 6 In the United Kingdom, the scheme introduced by the National Insurance Act 1948 initially provided only a flat-rate benefit. In the 1950s, occupational earnings-related provision grew strongly, a development welcomed by the Conservative Party but viewed with concern by Labour, which correctly anticipated that the voluntary coverage of occupational schemes would not extend to many blue-collar workers. In 1957, it produced a proposal for a scheme of earnings-related "national superannuation" that would cover everyone; and the Conservatives introduced a "graduated pension" soon after. This scheme and its successors had the important feature that "contracting out" was possible. This feature allowed employees and employers to direct part of their statutory pension contribution toward an equivalent occupational pension scheme. "Equivalence" meant that defined benefits had to be provided, and the government stood as guarantor for benefits equal to those that would have been achieved if the worker had stayed in the state scheme. An enhanced level of regulation accompanied this arrangement, whereas previously the authorities had left occupational schemes largely to their own devices.
In the 1980s, pressure to increase private relative to public provision increased in both countries. In the United States, the Social Security system came under severe financial pressure from adverse demographic changes. However, it proved robust in the face of proposals for privatization, although the scheme expansion of the 1950s and 1960s stopped, and incremental cuts were made. 7 Foiled in attempts at radical reform, critics of Social Security promoted instead a "layering" strategy, advocating the development of "a 'parallel system' of private individual accounts that could eventually be portrayed as a viable alternative to the public program." 8 Advocates of this strategy proposed to borrow the idea of contracting out from the United Kingdom 9 , although in the end "variations on the theme of extraordinary tax subsidy" 10 carried the day in popularizing private retirement saving, in particular 401(k) accounts.
In the United Kingdom, similar pressures to curtail state pensions led the government to make the terms for contracting out substantially more favorable. Furthermore, it cut the basic state pension by changing its indexation so that it no longer kept up with rising earnings. The state pension also slipped well below the level of benefit provided by the UK's relatively comprehensive means-tested social assistance system, with the result that an increasing number of pensioners sought to top up their pensions with means-tested benefits. This gave the government an additional fiscal incentive to promote private provision that would take pensioners out of the means-tested system.
A development affecting both countries from the 1980s onward was that traditional "defined benefit" (DB) occupational schemes were in decline. The reasons were manifold. Employer incentives to offer these pensions declined with changes in employment relationships. Unions highlighted unfairness in DB schemes, for example that employees with high terminal earnings (generally, those higher up the management ladder) got better returns on their contributions than those whose earnings peaked before retirement. Scheme failures led governments in both countries to establish guarantee funds, and to protect the funds they armed regulators with new powers to monitor funding levels more closely. Defined contribution (DC) schemes started to look more attractive to employers, and indeed many workers. Concerns about fairness to different groups of workers were more readily addressed, and the task of regulating to ensure that employers kept pension promises appeared much easier. Because no promise is made to provide a specific pension value in DC schemes, funding levels do not have to be monitored. The fiduciary role of the pension fund manager is greatly simplified: it is reduced to the task of accounting for contributions and investing them in accordance with the fund holders' instructions. Workers bear much more risk than they do in a DB scheme, but during periods of good stock market performance employees did not pay this much attention. Ghilarducci characterizes workers' preference for an individual fund as irrational, quoting an industry specialist: "It is ironic that employees seem to prefer the new species of retirement plan although it might not be as good for them." 11 Against this background, the authorities in the United Kingdom extended the contracting-out provisions to DC pensions, in the form of schemes run by employers as well as personal pensions, held by the individual. Of course, this meant that benefits could no longer be matched precisely to those expected under the state scheme, but nonetheless regulators kept a close eye on DC pensions, concerned with ensuring that they would provide an adequate substitute retirement income. One form this concern took was that extensive fiduciary obligations were imposed on the providers of DC pensions. Under the Financial Services Act 1986, investment advisers were subject to rules, formulated and monitored by a self-regulatory organization, which required them to know their customers (by doing a "fact find"), to recommend only suitable products, to keep adequate records, and so on. Thus incorrect decisions about pensions were not the sole responsibility of the contributor: pension advisers could also be held to account.
The significance of this became apparent in the regulatory response to what became known as the pensions "mis-selling" scandal. 12 Mis-selling occurred when people enrolled in personal DC pensions when they would have been better off remaining in occupational schemes or in the state scheme. Leaving an occupational scheme and taking up a personal pension was almost certain to reduce income in retirement, because the employer's contribution to the pension was lost. Byzantine tax rules also meant that some took up personal pensions when they could not qualify for the tax incentives that went with contracting out: they would have been better off remaining in the state scheme. Still others, principally older workers, would receive better benefits from the state scheme even once tax incentives were taken into account. 13 As the mis-selling scandal developed, it emerged that major financial service providers had failed to train advisers adequately and had created the wrong incentives through their remuneration systems, which rewarded sales agents for making deals whether they were in the customers' interests or not. Rather than courting bad publicity by testing the issues case by case, affected firms signed up to a wholesale compensation scheme. Mis-selling eventually cost the financial services industry some £13.5bn.
14 By 2000, reliance on industry self-regulation had come to an end with the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which was given the responsibility of promoting public awareness of financial services issues and protecting consumers in financial markets. 15 It implemented further measures to improve the "advice regime,"
and pursued more compensation cases. The authorities were also concerned about the level of charges imposed by pension providers, and the government introduced a special low-cost DC pension in 2000, the "stakeholder pension." This pension aimed to provide a way for individuals to save for retirement without having their funds eroded by fees and charges. Investment strategies were also prescribed: as in all DC pensions except those for the highest income earners, a diversified portfolio was required, and passive approaches relying on index-linked investments were envisaged, to help keep costs down. All employers were required to offer a stakeholder scheme to their employees if they did not have another suitable pension scheme in place. However, this product was not widely taken up.
In the United States, in the meantime, a decline in DB pensions was also occurring, and advocates of privatization turned their attention to various forms of individual retirement account (IRA). Compared with DC pensions in the United Kingdom, these IRAs were subject to much less regulatory control to ensure income adequacy in retirement. Most notably, although tax incentives were geared toward saving for the retirement date, there were no requirements to convert funds into an annuity on retirement. The vehicle that came to dominate retirement saving, the 401(k) account, is simply a tax-advantaged savings vehicle, made available through employers who offer a (whole or partial) "match" for employee contributions.
The disinclination, or failure, of US authorities to engage in protective regulation is most clearly revealed by the debates over the diversification of plan assets. The 401(k) tax incentive originally aimed to encourage profit sharing, and employers often provided their contribution to employees' plans in the form of corporate stock. As 401(k) plans evolved into retirement savings vehicles, lack of fund diversification became a major issue. The problem was highlighted when Enron collapsed in 2002 and it emerged that many employees' plans were heavily invested in Enron stock. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 made it easier for plan participants to change the composition of their funds by selling the employer's stock after an initial vesting period, but no mandatory restrictions were imposed to ensure that workers had diversified funds. 16 Employers opposed tighter rules, arguing that restrictions would reduce their incentive to contribute to 401(k) plans. They found some support within government: the Treasury argued that "arbitrary caps on employees 401(k) investment choices challenge fundamental notions of private property rights." 17 This position contrasts sharply with that of policymakers in the United Kingdom, who saw poor investment decisions as potentially having a directly negative effect on public finances.
More generally, fiduciary responsibilities for plan providers were weaker in the United States than in the United Kingdom. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provided that trustees of employment-based DC schemes had to comply with fiduciary standards of loyalty, prudence, and diversification. However, there was, as Zelinsky puts it, "an important safety valve: Under ERISA section 404(c), if a defined contribution plan permits each employee to direct the investment of the funds in his own account, the plan's trustee bears no liability to the employee for investments, on the apparent assumption that the employee is deciding for himself." 18 The vast majority of 401(k) plans are self-directed in this sense, so the responsibility of the individual plan participant for the performance of the plan is apparently clearly established.
In contrast with the United Kingdom, regulators in the United States did not regulate fees and charges levied on 401(k) funds. In the late 1990s a flurry of adverse media commentary criticized the fees in 401(k) plans, and the Department of Labor (DOL) undertook an investigation. However, it concluded that fee levels were reasonable and the issue died away. 19 It reemerged in the 2000s, spurred by disappointing investment returns. Congressional activism was reflected in a 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which recommended that Congress should amend ERISA to ensure that all 401(k) fees were reported and that service providers disclosed their compensation arrangements to sponsors. The possibility of opening government pension saving schemes to savers employed in the private sector was also discussed, as these schemes had lower costs and charges. 20 The financial crisis has produced further congressional initiatives (see below) but so far none of these has made it into the statute book.
By the late 1990s, it was clear that pension privatization was in serious trouble in both countries. The avowed aim of government policy was to promote private pension saving to complement public provision. However, DB provision was declining sharply, and savings into DC schemes did not make up for this decline. In both countries, spending on financial education was increased in an effort to explain to people the necessity of saving more for their old age. In the United States, the SAVER (Savings are Vital to Everyone's Retirement) Act of 1997 mandated the DOL to undertake financial education as well as working to extend the take-up of private plans through "social marketing." 21 The DOL sought to educate the public about the value of holding a diversified equity fund and against "reckless conservatism": investing a high proportion of their funds in low-risk, low-return assets. It tried to explain that risks were worth taking because they brought returns: "the greater the risk, the greater the potential reward." 22 In the United Kingdom, the FSA also eventually embraced the task of educating the population about the need to save for retirement, and, like the DOL, it encouraged investors to embrace risk by investing in equities.
Automatic enrollment
This general pattern of close regulatory intervention in the United Kingdom and less intensive control in the United States was carried through in the way that automatic enrollment was introduced in the two countries. In both countries, automatic enrollment existed as a "private" institution-in other words, as an employer practicebefore being promoted by statutory intervention. In the United States, McDonalds is often credited with pioneering automatic enrollment in 1984. 23 Some suggest that the policy was primarily designed to ensure that schemes complied with IRS nondiscrimination provisions. 24 These provisions are intended to ensure that tax relief on employee benefits is equitably distributed to low-paid and highly paid workers. This motive for automatic enrollment aroused some public policy concern: some feared it might be cheaper for firms than the principal alternative method of complying with nondiscrimination provisions, which was to make a very attractive offer to employees in the form of an enhanced employer match for their contributions. In other words, automaticity could be accompanied by lower employer contributions. Another concern was that, because of the lack of diversification provisions in ERISA rules on DC funds (see above), firms could use the funds to prop up their own share price, potentially to the future detriment of workers. Reflecting these public policy concerns, the Treasury and IRS issued guidance, starting in 1998, which outlined model rules for a company using automatic enrollment. These rules addressed the issues of employer match and fund diversification in particular.
In research done around that time, economists interested in behavioral biases in pension saving drew attention to the higher savings rates produced by automatic enrollment. 25 These findings were picked up by policymakers, and the policy agenda of regulating automatic enrollment to prevent employer abuses was reoriented toward promoting pension savings by encouraging employers to adopt the practice. The Pensions Protection Act (PPA) 2006 did this by offering employers more legal protection against possible claims that they had acted against employees' interests. It provided protection from state laws against deductions from wages, provided that employers complied with notice provisions to ensure that employees could exercise their rights not to have automatic deductions made. Tax rules on refunds of contributions when workers opted out after the first deductions had been made were simplified. One quid pro quo for employees was that their rights over their funds were strengthened: employer contributions would vest in the employee after two years.
Regulations made under to the act also allowed the DOL to develop its campaign against "reckless conservatism," which it had been pursuing through education initiatives. Employers tended to choose conservative investments for default funds, such as money market funds. These investment choices meant that funds were unlikely to decline in nominal value, but the rate of return they would earn was low. The explanation offered by Beshears et al. is that "[e]mployers were concerned that a default fund which declined in value could give rise to a participant class-action lawsuit." 26 In other words, it was believed that the expected value had a nominal anchor, and that failure to fulfill that expectation would produce a search for recourse on the part of contributors. Regulations brought forward under the PPA (2006) endeavored to promote the use of "target date funds" (TDFs) as default investments by employers. These are funds that follow a "lifecycle" investment strategy of moving into safer assets as retirement approaches. In the view of the authorities, these funds provided an appropriate combination of risk and return. Provided employers complied with these regulations, they would (it appeared) have satisfied their fiduciary obligations to their workers and they would therefore not be liable for scheme losses.
In the United Kingdom it will be compulsory starting in October 2012 for employers to provide automatic enrollment to their workers, and to make the specified employer match of employee contributions. In other words, workers will be nudged, but employers will be compelled. Furthermore, the funds that contributions can be invested in are much more tightly specified in the UK proposals. Existing company pension schemes will generally qualify to receive contributions from automatic enrollees, but personal pensions will not. Employers must either contract with a provider to offer a scheme on the designated terms, or make use of a default provider created by the government, now called the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST).
The proposal to introduce automatic enrollment can be traced to the work of the Pensions Commission, which deliberated between 2004 and 2006 on the reform of the whole UK pension system. It argued that a scheme that was voluntary for employers would not have any impact in the many workplaces where no pension scheme was currently in operation, so it would not be a comprehensive solution: many workers would be excluded and would not attain the target income of about 45 percent of previous earnings that the commission deemed desirable. 27 Furthermore, if private saving was to provide an adequate income, close attention had to be paid to the rate of return on contributions. High costs in private pension provision lowered expected returns by an unacceptable amount, creating too high a risk that pension savers would not be better off when automatically enrolled. The commission argued that the 1980s and 1990s had been a "fool's paradise" when high equity and bond returns swamped high administration charges, making personal pensions attractive for industry and for individuals. "As the end of the boom has brought a return to more rational return expectations, the unsustainable economics of individual pension sales to people of average income and below have become apparent." 28 In summary, this comparison of approaches to pension regulation in general, and automatic enrollment in particular, shows that regulators in the United Kingdom worked persistently to get more public policy leverage on private pensions than their counterparts in the United States. The reasons for this lay in the structure of the public pension system: both the contracting-out arrangements and the importance of meanstested supplements to the basic state pension. Although the Pensions Commission argued that means testing should be reduced and the basic pension increased, it still proceeded in the expectation that failures of private provision were likely to create a direct charge on the public purse.
In the United States, by contrast, these direct interdependencies between public and private pensions did not arise. There was evidently an important indirect relationship, whereby the growth in private provision could facilitate public cutbacks, but this relationship did not lure the advocates of privatization into proposing extensive regulation of private pensions to protect contributors and secure good rates of return. (Favorable tax treatment could do much of this job.) Advocates of market solutions were able to be more consistent than their UK counterparts, who came close to killing their golden goose with the very complex incentives created by contracting out and means testing.
Pension Regulation Meets Behavioral Economics
As the discussion in the previous section shows, regulators who designed policies to promote private pensions were well aware of potential problems in ensuring that contributors got good value from their DC pensions. However, they kept faith that a properly designed market, with adequate information available to rational consumers, would produce the outcomes that public policy sought. Insights from behavioral economics challenge that faith: they suggest that deviations from the behavior predicted by expected utility theory will be endemic and enduring in the face of information, education, and the promotion of transparency in product design. This section gives a brief account of the insights that are most relevant to retirement saving, and then considers the issues involved in drawing policy implications from behavioral economics. 29 Of course, economists have long been aware that consumers often do not behave rationally. In the standard list of market failures in welfare economics, "myopia" often appears, graced with little commentary but serving as an explanation of widespread government involvement in promoting saving for old age. Research in behavioral economics has given more systematic content to this awareness. Perhaps the most oftencited finding of behavioral economics is "loss aversion." People care more about losses than gains: receiving £40,000 when £50,000 was expected has a weightier (negative) effect on welfare than the (positive) effect of receiving £50,000 when £40,000 was expected. Loss aversion is a barrier to rational risk taking in a volatile market like the stock market. People's sense of well being suffers more from falls in the value of their shares than it benefits from increases. One implication is that less information may be better: by checking the performance of their shares less frequently, investors suffer fewer unpleasant experiences, especially if the market is volatile around a rising trend. Furthermore, since investors are excessively prone to end the unpleasantness by selling their shares when they decline in value, providing less regular statements to investors may produce better returns. 30 Another important behavioral phenomenon is "regret aversion." This means that people dislike making choices that may turn out to be wrong. People can avoid regret by choosing options that do not clearly reveal their wrongness against an alternative or benchmark. For example, taking out insurance involves some painful up-front expenditure, but avoids the greater pain of regret when an uninsured event takes place and the cost is evident. Conversely, investing in low-risk assets may be costly in foregone returns, but because the cost is hidden, there is less occasion for regret than if a highrisk investment is made.
These behavioral phenomena are part of the more general finding that people do not make decisions under uncertainty in accordance with expected utility theory. They do not calculate expected values (EVs) by assigning a probability to each possible outcome and summing the resulting values to form an expectation. This results in decision making under uncertainty which is inconsistent with the ranking of EVs. Regret theory and prospect theory (which explains loss aversion) were originally formulated as attempts to provide accounts of rational behavior which would improve on expected utility theory, a project which has engaged economists for a long time. 31 Modern behavioral economics has moved away from developing models of rational calculation and toward psychological accounts of behavioral regularities disclosed by empirical, often experimental, techniques.
Another set of findings of behavioral research that are particularly important to pensions concern the ways people respond to high levels of complex information. Transaction cost economics suggests that having to process information is a cost that people avoid, for example by using intermediaries or opting for simpler products. Behavioral studies add to this the finding that people do not necessarily avoid complex products even when they do not understand them; instead they are influenced by confidence in others (e.g., investment advisors), personal overconfidence, and herding (following the path taken by others). Market professionals exhibit these behaviors as well as consumers, although it remains open to question the extent to which remuneration structures in the financial services sector rather than psychologically grounded behavioral distortions explain observed herding behavior, overconfidence, and other outcomes.
The "nudge" view of the policy implications of behavioral economics is that the science gives policymakers a new armory of instruments for engineering desired social outcomes, while suggesting that other instruments-such as education about financial planning-are likely to be ineffective. These implications are broadly in the market failure tradition of regulation, in that they rest on the supposition that regulatory intervention can produce an outcome nearer to the welfare-maximizing solution than nonintervention.
One opposing view is that behavioral biases affect regulators just as much as consumers: expert decision making can be more flawed than that of "crowds." This view identifies the element of hubris in the project of reengineering the law governing market relationships for the greater good. 32 A related argument, which also suggests that regulatory correction may be misguided, is that market institutions correct themselves: market actors will "privately" develop institutions that combat behavioral biases. This is the view advanced by Robert Merton and Zvi Bodie, who propose a synthesis of neoclassical, institutional, and behavioral approaches to finance. They argue that institutions such as financial intermediaries and index funds are "an endogenous response to minimize the costs of transaction frictions and behavioral distortions." 33 Financial intermediaries are particularly important, as they optimize portfolios on behalf of individuals. Institutional designs to offset irrational behavior evolve through a version of the "invisible hand." Merton and Bodie refrain from explicitly criticizing regulatory interventions, noting that there is scope for normative analysis to formulate prescriptions for institutional innovation. However, their account suggests that "the market" is also a source of innovation, and those making the case for regulatory intervention therefore need to answer the question of why remedial institutions have not evolved of their own accord.
One answer is that market institutions may evolve to address failures that are bilateral, as the coordination problem between two parties can be resolved through private negotiation or arbitration. However, failures that are multilateral, and therefore have a public policy dimension, are not amenable to these private solutions. Thus the case for intervention rests on identifying the public policy purposes. This means that the regulatory authority is not solely concerned with making rules that achieve the best outcome for the individual: it also seeks an outcome that is, overall, socially desirable. Potentially, socially desirable behavior could conflict with self-interested behavior, and "nudge" could be used to promote the former.
Is it possible that automatic enrollment could be welfare reducing for individuals, even when it has the desirable social effect of promoting pension saving? The standard view is that DC investors should achieve adequate returns at reasonable risk by holding a diversified portfolio of financial assets, weighted toward equities. But when systemic failures produce correlated returns, diversification does not protect investors, as "market risk" cannot be diversified away. The effects are particularly important for retirement savings because of the significance of retirement date risk. To manage this risk, regulators in both the United States and the United Kingdom endorse "lifestage" or "target date" switching strategies, moving funds into safer assets as retirement approaches. However, as Burtless shows, there is no strategy that does not incur a significant cost in lost returns, and, furthermore, a person retiring at the worst possible time will always do much worse than one whose lifecycle bears a better relationship to financial market developments, regardless of the investment strategy used. 34 It may be possible for all investors to achieve returns higher than those received from safe investments in government bonds, but this may not be the correct benchmark. If expectations and regrets are formed in the light of the experience of other cohorts, those retiring at bad times will not be satisfied with the outcome of their investments.
This problem could be avoided, or at least mitigated, by placing contributions in a collective fund that distributed benefits smoothed across cohorts, using a formula based on underlying economic growth or investment returns rather than having distribution determined by the ups and downs of financial markets. However, the regulatory history of pensions has traveled firmly in the opposite direction to collective riskpooling. The reasons go back to the time when DB pensions came under heightened scrutiny for their lack of transparency and insecure funding. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, governments took steps to regulate DB pensions that encouraged a move toward DC schemes. Regulators tried to use the revealing light of the market to ensure that DB pension schemes were adequately funded. Rather than relying on corporate commitments, companies were required to maintain separate pension funds. The adequacy of these funds was assessed by valuing their assets at "fair market value" (in the US terminology) or by "marking to market" (in the United Kingdom). For regulators, these approaches to valuation were attractive because they used the market to reveal information. The market makes private information public: it serves the regulatory hunger for "transparency." However, the market valuation approach to pension scheme regulation has systemically perverse consequences, producing procyclical demands on employers. 35 When stock market valuations are high, companies can reduce their contributions. In downturns, pension funds appear to be in trouble, and struggling corporate sponsors are expected to increase their rate of contribution into their pension funds. The market valuation approach leads to sharply fluctuating assessments of solvency, and contributed to many employers' decisions to abandon DB schemes in favor of the DC model. We can gain further insight into the way that regulatory practice is imbricated with market norms from the decline of schemes operated by insurance companies that were designed to offer individual investors ways to pool risks. In the United Kingdom in the 1980s, many insurers offered "with profits" investment policies, whereby funds are invested on behalf of all subscribers and returns are distributed in the form of "bonuses," smoothed over good and bad years. The distribution of bonuses is at the discretion of the management board, advised by an actuary. The product design greatly reduces retirement date risk, but it lacks transparency. Furthermore, people who withdraw their funds early from these schemes are penalized, compared with those who maintain their investment for the full term. In 1997, the government ran a consultation on the design of DC pensions where it asked for views about the appropriateness of with-profits investments. Providers of unitized investments were quick to attack the with-profits model, which they portrayed as complex and nontransparent. They argued in favor of "daily valuations driven by markets and no discretionary judgments being applied." Techniques such as lifestage or target date switching could deal with volatility in returns just as well as with-profits smoothing, the former being "clearer, fairer and not subject to abuse." 36 The government apparently accepted these arguments, favoring unitized investments in the "stakeholder" pension product that it endorsed. Similar developments occurred in the United States, where retirement savings products that aimed to offer guarantees about future income were rapidly eclipsed by 401(k) plans.
In short, it would seem that automatic enrollment nudges people into contributing to risky investments. Collective investment instruments could reduce these risks, but they are not favored because savers and regulators alike seek "transparency," which is supposedly achieved by shedding the revealing light of the market upon investments. This means that behavioral distortions that affect market outcomes are embedded in the regulatory approach, rather than being countered by regulation.
This conclusion is not accepted in some accounts of how regulatory lessons can be drawn from behavioralist insights. Behavioral economics is divided between micro and macro perspectives, or those that focus on individual failures to maximize welfare and those who identify systemic effects. The former approach provides readier applications of behavioral research based on psychological insights, which identify the "ghost in the machine" as the spectral presence of evolved biological behavior patterns in the brains of modern, rational, calculative human beings. But the machine may also refer to the market economy, and the ghost to the psychosocial processes that drive periodic instability and cyclical swings.
Adherents to the microeconomic view reject the possibility that market outturns will be affected by behavioral biases, holding instead that deviations from rational behavior have only "intramarginal" effects on the whole economy. Behavioral biases will be intramarginal if they only affect some market participants, for example naïve investors. Prices and allocations will be determined at the margin by efficient market participants, so the economic system still performs efficiently, but with distributional outcomes that disadvantage particular weak groups ("ordinary people"). The reasoning is familiar from the analysis of competitive markets: efficiency gains from competition are achieved even if not all consumers shop around and seek the best buys, as the marginal active consumers will determine firms' strategies. Behavioral biases only matter because of their distributional effects: intramarginal passive consumers may do worse out of market transactions than they should, and the asymmetrically paternalist regulator can try to correct this.
Theories of the systemic effects of behavioral biases challenge this account. Instead of efficient marginal traders countering the impact of inefficiency and irrationality, these theories show how behavioral biases produce correlated and mutually reinforcing decisions. Such accounts have been developed to explain why financial markets are highly cyclical, with market movements driven by bouts of optimism and pessimism, exaggerated by herding behavior. 37 Although some market participants may not be susceptible to these biases ("smart money" investors), their strategies are not stabilizing as the "intramarginal" theory would predict, because they can profit by predicting the actions of "noise traders" who follow the market. The general implication of these theories is that financial markets (in particular) are prone to excessive systemic risk. This means that markets will move in a highly correlated way, through bull and bear phases. This matters for deriving policy implications from behavioral economics, because it means that nudging individuals with default terms will not address pervasive systemic problems that arise from behavioral biases. 38 In short, automatic enrollment is based on very partial lesson drawing from behavioral economics. It addresses the individual-level ghosts of inertia and reluctance to save for retirement, but it does not address the systemic ghosts that mean that retirement income security is not achieved by investing individual funds in financial instruments. Regulators have promoted these DC funds because they conform to regulatory norms about competition, choice, and transparency, but behavioral insights suggest that adherence to these norms does not enhance consumer welfare as it would in a world where no behavioral distortions were present. In Shiller's pithy summary, "making generations depend on the success of their investments for their own retirement is not risk management," 39 yet this is what automatic enrollment entails.
Shaping and Meeting Expectations
When parties voluntarily enter market transactions, they do so in the expectation of mutual benefit. In any risky transaction like an investment, the prospect arises that these benefits will not materialize. If this risk was incorporated in initial expectations, then market stability is not jeopardized. If, however, parties make losses that were not factored into initial expectations, then they can be expected to seek recourse for their losses. Where recourse is sought depends on the object of the expectation. It may be sought from the other party in a bilateral contract if expectations of their fair and reasonable conduct are not fulfilled, but it may also be sought from a regulator if its commitments are thought to have been breached.
The formal specification of a DC savings contract seems, at first sight, to be well designed to avoid disappointed expectations. This is because the contract does not specify the value that will be achieved at the end date (retirement). Instead, it states that this value will depend on market investment returns, less administration and management costs. Contributors can form an expectation about the final value of the fund based on information about risk and returns, but they supposedly do not form expectations of the other parties to the contract (the employer, or the investment manager), because performance depends on "the market."
Expected utility theory states that contributors should evaluate the expected value of the contract using the available information on risk and return. They should then be satisfied with the actual value, provided this actual value was generated by a process with the specified expected value. However, we know that people do not consistently calculate expected values. We do not know much about how expectations are formed, except that social context is likely to matter and that people will use shortcuts and heuristics. Expectations may be about value and/or about process. For example, a possible value expectation may be: "at least I will get out more than I paid in," while an example of a process expectation is "my employer (or financial service provider) is taking care to ensure that my money is appropriately invested." These expectations will be shaped by the parties (e.g., through advertising by the seller of the product), through social processes (e.g., views circulated among employees or other social groups, media reports) and by statements made by trusted authorities, such as regulators. Although these processes and the resulting expectation heuristics are not legally authoritative, they are important in constituting the market. Without them, transactions might not take place at all.
What expectations are likely to accompany automatic enrollment? Employers' willingness to enroll their workers in the United States suggests that they are fairly sure that workers would be satisfied with the outcome of their participation in a 401(k) plan. There are different interpretations of this apparent satisfaction. The interpretation advanced in much public policy commentary is that workers recognize that they need to save more for their retirement, and they are therefore content with a policy that levers them into doing this, even if they would not have done it on their own initiative. An alternative interpretation is that workers are content to contribute to a 401(k) plan because of its tax advantages. Although early distributions incur penalties, contributors can borrow against their 401(k) plans, obtain hardship payments in some circumstances, and cash in plans after age fifty-nine and a half.
Consider the difference between these interpretations. The need to save more for retirement may be recognized as a general goal, but misperceptions about potential sources of income and incorrect expectations are widespread. Ghilarducci argues that "workers exaggerate their abilities to provide for their own retirement" because of various cognitive biases. 40 She shows just how implausible it is to think that workers contribute to 401(k) plans with a target retirement income in mind, given the parameters that have to be determined and the scope for errors in calculating from the parameters. Information is given to workers about the income in retirement they can expect from their contributions, but evidence suggests that this is not meaningful, as people contribute much less than their income expectations require.
An important feature of 401(k) plans is that sponsors do not make commitments about future income: they generally distribute accumulated funds as a lump sum, leaving holders to reinvest the funds or purchase an annuity. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, opportunities to take retirement savings as a lump sum or to obtain early access to them are limited. For most people, it will continue to be compulsory to convert most of the funds into annuities. 41 Expectations about retirement income are therefore more firmly anchored in the institutional setup for automatic enrollment in the United Kingdom than in the United States.
In developing its proposals for automatic enrollment, the UK Pensions Commission prepared detailed analyses of the relationship between contributions and income replacement in retirement. Focusing on the average contributor, it proposed a contribution rate that, in conjunction with the public pension, would produce an earnings replacement rate of 45 percent. 42 The commission was well aware that this anchoring of expectations carried the political risk that returns on default funds would be seen as implicitly guaranteed by the government. It addressed this question in making recommendations about communication with contributors about the performance of funds and retirement income projections, noting the need to "frame descriptions in a way that makes it clear that indicative returns are no more than indicative. A clear description of the risks and possible returns within the default fund will clearly be essential." 43 But, as noted above, behavioral evidence suggests that contributors will not use this information to evaluate the expected value of the contract, and that they will form expectations based on a selective reading of the information they are given, along with other contextual information.
Some critics of establishing a government agency to receive default contributions suggested that having a single national scheme would increase the political liabilities attached to automatic enrollment. Alternative models were put forward that envisaged having multiple providers or funds, with contributors either making choices or being assigned by a "carousel." However, such models carry their own risks of disappointment. Contributors assigned to underperforming funds will have a ready benchmark of comparison with other funds, against which to form expectations and see them unfulfilled. This benchmarking or "reference point effect" suggests that there may be fewer grievances if all investors get the same return, even if that return is low. The commission was apparently aware of this problem, and it concluded that the risks of disappointment "could actually be more severe, and more of a problem for government, under the alternative models proposed." 44 The commission's view that market intermediaries would not diffuse responsibility is supported by the outcome of the Equitable Life affair. This venerable mutual society ran into difficulties honoring commitments about annuity rates made in the 1980s and 1990s. Aggrieved investors turned their attention to the government, claiming that the regulator had failed to address governance failures in the company. They succeeded in getting partial compensation for "a decade of regulatory failure." 45 Critical commentators have suggested that "turning regulators into guarantors" could lead to overcautious regulation, and have pointed out that the distributive outcome favors relatively prosperous policyholders at the expense of the taxpayer. 46 However, a sustained political and legal campaign forced the government to accept some liability.
In the United States, the regulatory authorities have avoided becoming the object of disappointed expectations. Instead, the focus of the search for recourse has been on employers. This has occurred despite the provisions in the PPA (2006), which appeared to provide legal comfort for employers against claims that they had breached their fiduciary obligations. In tracing how this has come about, we can note first that many of those employers who initially adopted automatic enrollment were apparently aware of the dangers of not meeting employees' investment expectations. Specifically, the evidence suggests that the expectation of nominal gain was significant: as noted above, employers often invested default funds conservatively to avoid the risk that disappointed employees would sue them for losses. This strategy conforms to behavioral economics findings about the nature of loss aversion: a nominal loss would be more strongly felt than a foregone investment return.
Events in 2008-09 suggest that employers were right to believe that participants' expectations were anchored around the maintenance of the nominal value of their funds. Regulatory endorsement of TDFs created an expectation that this investment strategy would always protect contributors' funds at retirement, but the financial markets crash saw large losses in the nominal value of funds, including those of people about to retire. Congress pressed for a review of TDFs by the GAO, which concluded that participants should be given more information and employers should exercise more fiduciary responsibility in ensuring that TDFs were appropriately adapted to conditions in their sector. 47 Thus contributors' disappointed expectations found a handle in criticisms of fiduciary behavior.
Critics also raised the issue of deductions made for administration and fund management, alluding darkly to possible conflicts of interest leading employers to fail to find the best value for money in scheme administration for their employees. The financial crisis gave a new impetus to these questions, as excessive fees became linked to industry malpractices around risk-taking incentives and bonus payments. George Miller (D-CA), a prominent congressional campaigner, thundered that the industry's days of concealment were over: a new era of transparency was dawning. 48 For the time being, all these legislative proposals have failed, but contributors have had some success with the alternative strategy of seeking recourse from employers in the courts. Cases have been working their way through the legal system since the stock market crash of 2001, but the recent decline in stock markets brought a surge of new class-action suits. The courts have not generally accepted attempts to hold employers responsible when individual 401(k) funds deliver disappointing returns, but some decisions have brought the prospect of enlargement of employers' fiduciary obligations on investment strategy, fees, and charges. 49 The DOL has intervened with amicus briefs, which argue that employers have fiduciary obligations to consider such factors as whether the level of fees charged is reasonable in the light of the services provided and whether there could be conflicts of interest arising from affiliations between advisers and pension providers. Although these arguments remain contested in the courts, the pressure of legal uncertainty has nonetheless produced some victories for aggrieved employees. For example, in 2010 Bechtel agreed to pay $18.5 million to settle a classaction lawsuit alleging that the fees charged to employees in its 401(k) retirement plan were too high. The plaintiffs (Bechtel employees) claimed that the company should have negotiated lower expenses in its plan. 50 By comparison with the United Kingdom, it is clear that the government in the United States has avoided becoming the focus for contributors' grievances about the underperformance of their funds. Factors that explain this include the government's forbearance in avoiding anchoring expectations by offering projections of returns and retirement incomes, along with the more voluntaristic structure of automatic enrollment, which leaves the key decisions with employers. Behind this forbearance lies the Social Security system, which provides a floor of retirement income security without means testing. 51 The importance of this is brought into sharp relief by the comparison with the United Kingdom, where the financial services sector has become an increasingly vocal advocate of a universal flat-rate pension. This, it is argued, would reduce regulatory intervention as well as increasing the likelihood that contributors will gain an overall positive return on their pension savings.
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Conclusion
The fashion for behavioral economics and "nudge" policies has opened up a new set of public policy options in liberal market economies. This paper has discussed how governments in the United States and the United Kingdom have embraced "nudge" in the form of automatic enrollment into retirement savings schemes. Significant differences exist between the two countries' policies-differences, it has been argued, that affect the way in which the expectations of enrollees are shaped, as well as determining the likely targets of any quest for recourse for disappointed expectations. This conclusion considers the significance of these differences for our understanding of liberalism.
The automatic enrollment policy in the United Kingdom is more "shove" than "nudge": it has compulsory elements and it is supported by detailed regulations and the creation of a new public body (NEST). The proximate origins of the UK's lessliberal policy lie in the structure of its public pension system. The goals of automatic enrollment policy have become defined around fiscal objectives, which the meanstested element of the public pension brings into sharp focus. The tension in asymmetric paternalism between pursuing public policy goals and promoting the welfare of the nudged individual is more evident in the United Kingdom than the United States. In the United States, increasing private retirement saving is a nonpartisan policy goal, but there is not the same public policy imperative to ensure that pensioners achieve a target private retirement income. Because the public scheme, Social Security, is not means tested, public spending is not directly affected by pensioners' private income. The government has therefore been able to leave decisions about defaults to employers, and the search for recourse when things go wrong has also focused on employers.
An impediment to understanding variation within liberal welfare states is the assumption that liberalism is a default mode of the global economy: the place where countries go when political institutions can no longer sustain welfare settlements. Yet means testing, the sine qua non of the liberal welfare regime, is always in tension with maintaining market incentives. This tension is evident in pension policy in attempts to maintain and promote retirement savings institutions. In this light, the United States stands as the more liberal market economy in its approach to regulating private pensions because it is endowed with a contributory Social Security scheme, which, for all the pressures on it, remains the underpinning of retirement income security for most Americans. This legacy of New Deal social democracy sustains a liberal regulatory order. The wider implication is that liberal political economy does not function effectively as a whole system; it is stabilized by pockets of paternalism and social democracy.
And this, of course, takes us right back to the flaw at the heart of the liberal account of the market: the idea that market orders are naturally stable and need only marginal correction for welfare maximization. Market institutions for retirement income provision have been endemically unstable. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, automatic enrollment is inserted into an elaborate structure of relationships between contributors, employers, financial service providers, and the state. Evaluating automatic enrollment as a market institution means asking questions about how participants' expectations are shaped, whether these expectations are likely to be met, and what the consequences will be if expectations are disappointed. These are more difficult questions than those about "asymmetric paternalism" that are asked within a liberal frame of reference, and the answers are much less favorable to "nudge." 
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